Abstract
Introduction
This paper investigates the sources of the decline in the energy intensity of the U.S. economy during the period 1958-2000, in particular the impact of technological change and its importance relative to that of other influences. This issue, with which economists have wrestled for three decades, is again a focus of interest, stimulated by recent energy price increases and proposals to reduce the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions associated with fossil fuel use.
The OPEC oil price shocks of the 1970s and their adverse economic consequences generated a groundswell of empirical research on the reaction of technology to such price changes. However, questions remain about both the sign and magnitude of the effects of energy prices on innovation, and the follow-on impact of technological change on the intensity of energy use. Concern has also arisen over the economic impacts of measures to deal with the problem of climate change, particularly energy price increases induced by limits on carbon dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel combustion. Of particular interest is the potential for induced technical change (ITC), whereby regulations to reduce emissions stimulate innovation which saves energy and reduces emissions. 1 Finally, apprehension over the economic consequences of the current high global energy prices has re-kindled interest in the robustness of U.S. productivity growth to price shocks. 2 In the present paper I focus on the relationship between energy prices and energy productivity, or, more specifically, its inverse-energy intensity. Figure 1 illustrates the historical trends of these variables in the U.S. economy. The most striking feature is the 1 Energy-saving technological change is frequently adduced as the saving grace that will moderate the costs of abating CO 2 emissions over the long time-horizon on which emission limits are anticipated to bind. Sue Wing (2006) elucidates the mechanisms by which changes in relative prices influence the rate and direction of firms' innovation. sustained reduction in the energy-GDP ratio, whose steepest decline occurs in the period [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] , during which energy prices first jumped due to the OPEC oil shocks, and then collapsed. I consider three channels through which prices influence energy intensity: (1) input substitutionthe direct effect of increases in energy's relative price on the mix of inputs to production, holding the state of technology constant, (2) innovation-resulting from both the secular progress of scientific advance and the inducement effects of high energy prices, and (3) changes in the mix of industries in the economy. Despite much prior work scrutinizing each of these mechanisms, the empirical estimates developed by different studies are for the most part incommensurate. The objective here is to develop comprehensive and comparable estimates for the magnitudes of these influences.
The first comprehensive econometric estimates of the substitution effects of the energy price shocks of the 1970s were developed by Jorgenson and Fraumeni (1981) and Jorgenson (1984) . The principal advantage of this work, which was conducted at the industry level, is its coverage of the entire supply side of the U.S. economy. Most controversial have been its estimates of the effects of disembodied technical progress on energy demand, which indicate that the majority of U.S. industries exhibit an energy-using bias of innovation. Not only is this result seemingly at odds with the observed decline in energy intensity, it is inconsistent with the assumption of aggregate energy-saving technical change (the autonomous energy efficiency improvement, or AEEI) which underpins most of the simulations of future energy use and CO 2 emissions. 3 Indeed, on the basis of this result Hogan and Jorgenson (1991) argue that the AEEI might actually be negative! A potential resolution to this paradox lies in the fact that Jorgenson's findings were generated using a dataset which ends 1979, when energy prices were at their peak, just prior to the sharp decline in the energy-GDP ratio. Thus, a key theme of this paper is the question of whether there is still evidence for widespread disembodied energy-using innovation over a longer sample which encompasses the period in Figure 1 .
The bias of technical change with respect to energy is also ripe for re-examination given results from more recent investigations of ITC at the micro level, which suggest that innovation has been energy-saving in character, and has, moreover, been induced by energy prices. Using patent data, Popp (2002) demonstrates that the energy price shocks of the 1970s induced a substantial amount of energy-saving innovation. Complementary work by Newell et al (1999) finds that energy prices induced energy-saving changes in the characteristics of residential capital. 4 However, there is continuing debate over the magnitude of the aggregate impact of these phenomena, with two investigations of its effect on energy use manufacturing sectors reaching very different conclusions. Popp (2001) estimates that one third of the reduction in manufacturing industries' energy-output ratios to the effects of energy-related knowledge embodied in patents. By contrast, Linn (2006) estimates that adoption of energy-saving technology by new manufacturing plants in response to a ten-percent rise in energy prices resulted in only a one-percent reduction in energy demand. These findings raise additional questions about the sources of intensity change: first, how much has energy price-induced increasing economic development as justification for a declining coefficient on energy input. They construct a simulation model that incorporates an increasing index of energy-saving technology, whose inverse is applied as an attenuation factor to the model's fuels demand functions. This trick is still employed in the majority of climate policy models. 4 Newell et al (1999) find that energy prices and regulatory stimuli positively affect the energy-efficiency characteristics of consumer durables for heating and cooling. Popp (2002) finds that the propensity to patent in energy technology fields was significantly increased by rising energy prices in the 1970s.
innovation altered the characteristics of non-residential capital, and second, what has been the follow-on impact on aggregate energy intensity.
To address the latter question it is necessary to understand how the effects of technology on energy demand aggregate up to the level of the macroeconomy. This issue is the focus of decomposition studies (see, e.g., the survey by Ang and Zhang, 2000) which combine industry and macroeconomic data to isolate how changes in the mix of economic sectors have affected the evolution of the energy-GDP ratio. These have tended to attribute much of the decline in intensity to changes in the composition of output (e.g., Rose and Chen 1991), particularly among manufacturing industries (Hirst et al 1983; Schipper et al 1990) . Motivated by these findings, the paper investigates whether structural change was a more or less important contributor to aggregate energy intensity than substitution or innovation.
To sort out the contributions of these various influences at the aggregate level in a comprehensive and consistent manner, I employ a synthesis of the methodological approaches outlined above. Following Jorgenson's lead, I maximize sectoral coverage by accounting for the sources of change in energy intensity within 35 economic sectors at the approximate 2-digit level of aggregation. To investigate the importance of changes in the composition of industries' capital relative to substitution and innovation, I develop an econometric model of dynamic factor demands which incorporates a broad array of quasi-fixed inputs, and perform estimations using a unique dataset for the period 1958-2000 which updates Jorgenson's results across the full range of producing sectors in the economy. Finally, the resulting sectoral estimates are aggregated using a decomposition technique, thereby reconciling the apparent differences between energy intensity trends at the micro and macro levels of the economy.
Embodied in this approach are two key innovations. The first is the extension of Popp's (2001) econometric model of ITC to incorporate a proxy for the stock of energy-saving knowledge which is based solely on energy price data. This permits the impacts of exogenous and induced technical progress on industries' demands for energy to be separately identified. The second is the development of a simple decomposition scheme which attributes changes in aggregate energy intensity to the influence of changes in the mix of industries and factors which occur within industries. This scheme provides a mechanism for aggregating the econometric estimates across sectors to yield comparable measures of the macroeconomic impacts of substitution, technical progress and capital accumulation.
I find that change in the sectoral composition of the economy is the main driver of the decline in aggregate energy intensity over the sample period. Of the changes that occur within industries, disembodied exogenous technical progress is the predominant energy-saving influence, with shifts in the composition of capital coming a close second. The influence of substitution is mixed. It had a substantial energy-saving effect during the period of high energy prices in the 1970s and 80s, but was slightly energy using over the remainder of the sample period. Finally, disembodied induced technical change was energy saving as well, but of the factors considered it has the smallest impact, which only arises in the aftermath of the energy price shocks.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 develops an econometric model of producer behavior which provides a natural way to account for the sources of change in the energy intensity of economic sectors. There I also outline the decomposition procedure which facilitates consistent aggregation of the sectoral econometric estimates. Section 3 describes the data and the estimation technique. In Section 4 presents and discusses the econometric estimates of the sources of change in energy demand within the different industries. Section 5 presents the results of the decomposition analysis, which aggregates over industries to elucidate the contributions of their constituent sources of change to the evolution of the energy-GDP ratio. Section 6 concludes with a discussion of caveats and future research needs in this area.
Modeling The Sources of Change in Energy Demand

An econometric model of producer behavior
The economy is modeled as a collection of industries, indexed by i = 1, ..., N. In each industry there is a representative producer with a short-run restricted variable cost function
, in which P i is a vector of variable input prices, X i is the level and i X ɺ is the change in the vector of quasi-fixed inputs to production, Y i is the level of output and t is time. Each producer faces the problem of choosing the trajectory of quasi-fixed inputs to minimize the present discounted value of costs:
where r is the interest rate, X ɺ , the solution to the problem in eq. (1) is given by the equilibrium condition: Following Berndt, Morrison and Watkins (1981) , Watkins and Berndt (1992) , and especially Popp (2001) , industry i's normalized RVCF is specified using a quadratic approximation for G: 
The variable t is a time trend, which is designed to capture the effects of exogenous technical progress on the demands for variable inputs. The objective is to estimate the coefficients α, β and γ. 
.
When the stocks of quasi-fixed inputs have fully adjusted to their optimal intensities, * ki x , both the change in the levels of these stocks, * ki x ɺ , and the marginal unit adjustment costs must be zero.
We therefore have:
which implies the following restriction on the parameters:
By Shepard's Lemma, the optimal conditional short-run input demands are given by the derivatives of G i with respect to the normalized prices of the variable inputs. Imposing LRCRTS using eq. (5) then yields conditional input demand functions for energy and materials:
The associated conditional demand for labor is derived as a residual from eq. (3):
. 
Finally, it is useful to derive the long-run equilibrium effect of quasi-fixed inputs on variable cost, which is found by differentiating (3) with respect to X ki :
This expression, along with eq. (4), implies that the equilibrium condition in (2) may be solved for the optimal quantity of quasi-fixed inputs per unit of output: suggest that the capitalization of new technology into successive generations of assets is likely to be an important factor which mitigates this upward trend. This econometric framework gives us the ability to separately identify the impacts of both processes on industries' demand for energy.
The model's disadvantage is its limited capability to identify the influence of priceinduced energy-saving innovation. Linn (2006) identifies this effect using the difference between the energy intensities of incumbent and entrant manufacturing plants, while Popp (2001) uses the cumulated stocks of energy patents in each industry as direct proxy for the intangible output of innovation. The latter approach is attractive because it is the equivalent of specifying a stock of disembodied energy-saving knowledge as a quasi-fixed input in the model, but the absence of data on the use of patents by industry prevented me from implementing this scheme directly. 5 The first novel aspect of this study is its use of the trick of cumulating energy price increases as the proxy for the stock of knowledge. The fundamental assumption in this regard is that energy price shocks stimulate the creation of energy-saving ideas and process and product designs. The latter make up a stock of intangible capital whose effect on energy demand is mediated by three forces: persistence in the energy-saving effect of price shocks due to the durability of inventions and ideas, declining energy-saving effects with the passage of time due to the obsolescence of these factors, and lags in the onset of induced energy savings due to the time necessary to conduct research and innovation, and to diffuse the resulting innovations among the firms in each industry.
I model these forces in the same way as Popp (2001) , representing inducement via energy price increases instead of patent counts. 6 Following his eq. (3), my proxy for the stock of disembodied energy-saving knowledge in year t (X Knowledge, i, t ), is the sum of past energy price increases, 7 weighted by the time-dependent influences of knowledge decay and diffusion:
(10)
Here, s denotes the number of years before t, while δ 1 and δ 2 are endogenous parameters which indicate the rates of decay and diffusion. Thus, in eq. (6) A few caveats should be noted. First, this specification could hardly be more optimistic, as the definition of π E assumes that any increase in energy prices will induce energy-saving technical change. Thus, ITC will occur even if the positive price shock comes along after a significant decline in energy prices below their long-run average level-a situation in which there might well be little or no stimulus to innovate, as the techniques of production which are appropriate for higher energy-price regimes clearly already exist, and may be re-activated via substitution. 8 However, the adverse impact of this potential misspecification is mitigated by the fact that strength of the inducement effect-and the influence of the resulting energy-saving knowledge on energy demand-depends on δ 1 and δ 2 , whose values are conditioned on the data, controlling for the influence of energy-materials substitution.
A second issue is that the model gives the inducement effect of energy prices perhaps more prominence than is deserved, as it is likely that the prices of all inputs will simultaneously influence the creation of different kinds of productivity-enhancing knowledge. The stock of knowledge induced by shocks to the relative price of materials is not resolved. 9 Had it been included, the total effect of all types of disembodied knowledge might well differ from that captured solely by eq. (10), suggesting the possibility of omitted variable bias. But to the extent that omitted knowledge stocks increase steadily in magnitude, their influence will be captured by the secular time trend, with the result that α ET will reflect the additional impact of (latent)
induced innovation which conserves non-energy inputs. 8 See, e.g., the discussion in Sue Wing (2006: 5-7). 9 Its inclusion was not possible due to limitations of computational cost, and especially degrees of freedom. 
The sources of change in energy intensity in the short and the long run
The econometric model provides a unifying framework with which to elaborate the sources of change in energy intensity at the industry level. 10 This is apparent from the discrete log-derivative of eq. (6): 
These expressions have a natural interpretation as the average rates of exogenous and induced disembodied technical progress.
The last set of parameters, Subsumed within the final term on the right-hand side of eq. (11) are the long-run influences of the evolution of quasi-fixed input stocks on the price responsiveness and efficiency 11 The corresponding short-run elasticities, ε Eki , are zero by definition. of production. As previously mentioned, the direct effect of capital accumulation on energy intensity will be positive in so far as assets require energy to generate economic services.
Embodied innovations can directly counterbalance this effect by improving the energy efficiency of successive generations of assets. But they may also have the more subtle effect of making the production process more flexible, increasing the elasticity of substitution and the responsiveness of inputs demands to changes in relative prices. The first effect is identified from the interaction of capital and time, while the second is identified from the interaction of capital and variable input prices.
The proxies for these influences are the long-run analogues of (12) and (13) The difference between the short-and long-run elasticities is the additional effect of embodiment. Eq. (9) gives us the ability to identify how much of each type of influence is associated with a given type of capital: 12 We do not identify the long-run rate of induced technical progress. 
The aggregate implications of industry-level intensity change
I now turn to the second novel feature of the analysis, which is a method for assessing the implications of the aforementioned sectoral results at the aggregate level. My approach is to decompose aggregate intensity change into industry-level intensity change and structural change.
I do this by modeling the ratio of aggregate energy use, E Agg , to GDP, Y Agg , as the weighted sum of the contemporaneous energy intensities of the i industries in the economy:
φ , where each weight (φ i ) is the ratio of industry i's share of GDP to its share of total energy use. 13 It is easily shown that the logarithmic derivative of this expression is: 
Data and Estimation
To maximize the industry coverage of the econometric analysis, the KLEM dataset Information on the different classes of quasi-fixed inputs is drawn from a secondary dataset, which is the real cost net capital stocks series by detailed asset and detailed industry from the BEA. 16 The industry-by-asset series are truncated to match the time period of the Jorgenson dataset and apportioned among industry categories to match Jorgenson's sectoral disaggregation (approximately 2-digit SIC). The different assets were also aggregated into five 15 I thank Jon Samuels for these data. 16 BEA (2003) Descriptive statistics for the final dataset are shown in Table 1 . I append random error terms to eqs. (6)- (8) and estimate these expressions as a separate simultaneous equations time series regression with 45 free parameters for each industry. The resulting system was estimated using GMM, with the normalized variable input prices, the quasi-fixed input intensities, a time trend and the knowledge stocks as instruments. Andrews' (1991) technique was used to compute the standard errors, which are robust to autocorrelation of up to third order.
To construct the stocks of energy-saving knowledge it is necessary to compute the technological decay and diffusion coefficients, 
Econometric Results
The estimation results are too numerous to discuss in detail. The values, standard errors and levels of significance of the estimated coefficients of the energy intensity equation (6) 
Short-and long-run variable input price elasticities
The estimates of the average variable input price elasticities are shown in Table 2 . The average short-run own-price elasticities, EE ε , are uniformly inelastic, significant in the majority of industries, and mostly of the expected sign.
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The average short-run cross-price elasticities for energy and materials, EM ε , are significant in just over half of the industries, and the majority of these suggest energy-using impacts. The energy-saving influence of materials prices is concentrated in mining, transportation and utilities, while the energy-using impacts are concentrated in manufacturing.
The two elastic responses are both negative, occurring in the non-metal mining and communications sectors.
With regard to long-run impacts, 14 of the average own-price elasticities, EE η , are significant, with three being positive and two being elastic. 18 We do not report the long-run energy-material cross-price elasticities, EM η , only three of which are significant, and are mostly energy using. 19 This suggests that the influence of embodied innovations on the fungibility of variable inputs has had a negligible overall impact on energy intensity. Given the mix of positive and negative influences associated with the different types of capital, the previous finding that embodiment has little net impact on substitution is unsurprising.
Quasi-fixed input elasticities
Stocks of Energy-Saving Knowledge
I first present estimates of the stocks of energy-saving knowledge before going on to describe their effects on energy demand. The estimates of Table 3 indicate that the rates of decay and particularly diffusion of energy-saving knowledge tend to be slow, with a few 19 Non-metal mining and furniture manufacturing exhibit elastic responses, with the former being negative and the latter positive. 20 Of these construction and lumber and wood are positive, while financial services is negative.
signal exceptions. 21 The average lag before which energy prices shocks induce the maximum amount of knowledge, T Peak, i = log(1 - 22 ranges from virtually instantaneous to several decades, with a median value of 2.6 years. Figure 3 shows the impulse response of knowledge to technological inducement at the median values of Figure 4 , but although there is a similar median lag between the onset of the price shock and the maximum impact on innovation (and energy savings), the present stocks of knowledge decay twice as fast, and the maximum impact on knowledge accumulation is only 50 percent larger than the instantaneous effect-roughly a quarter of that found by Popp. The implication of these dynamics is that the effects of ITC dissipate after 20 years, which has an important bearing on the estimates of the effect of technical progress on energy intensity. Jorgenson and Fraumeni's (1979) estimates are significant in all but six industries and suggest that the effect of technical change is overwhelmingly energy using. Jorgenson's (1984) results exhibit more variability, but still show a dominant pattern of energy-using technical progress across industries. His estimates for both electric and non-electric energy inputs are 21 e.g., coal mining, textiles, rubber and plastics, gas utilities, financial services and government enterprises. 22 Note that T Peak, i = arg max t {exp(-
Elasticities of technical change
positive and significant in 14 sectors, and negative and significant in only three. For the remaining sectors, the secular trends in the conditional demands for electricity and non-electric energy are either not significant, or have opposing signs, suggesting an ambiguous overall effect. 23 The magnitude of these estimates is generally small, and their cross-industry distribution is negatively skewed. For both electric and non-electric energy, the average of the significant estimates is negative while the median is positive, reflecting Jorgenson's finding that prior to 1980 the influence of technological change on energy demand was small and positive in many industries, but large and negative in a small number of industries. These results indicate that technical progress had a negative overall influence on industries' energy intensity. Moreover, they suggest that industries' energy-saving response to induced innovation was very strong, exceeding even that found Popp (cf. his Table 5 ), which is in apparent contrast to Linn's (2006) findings. However, considerable care is necessary in interpreting these results. The impacts of ITC depends on the sectoral input intensities of energysaving knowledge (x Knowledge ), whose magnitudes tend to be quite small, especially when 23 The latter situation prevails in nine industries. 24 In the case of electric energy input, the industries with the five largest estimated coefficients all exhibit an energysaving bias, while in the case of non-electric energy inputs, the largest estimated coefficient is negative and an order of magnitude bigger than the second-largest.
compared to the stocks of physical capital. Consequently, its ultimate impact is far more modest that the coefficients in panel D seem to imply. An additional issue is that the ITC coefficient is not precisely estimated in many industries, which is symptomatic of collinearity between p E and X Knowledge , 25 and reflects the difficulties that arise from using an input based proxy for innovation instead of an observable measure of innovatory output such as patent counts. Replacing π E with the latter might well improve the estimates in this regard. However, the extent to which this might change the results, and in what direction, are questions that I leave to future research.
The average elasticities in panels E and F are mostly inelastic, and their signs correspond to those of the relevant parameter estimates. Across industries, the overall effects on energy intensity of both exogenous and induced technical change are negative and substantial.
Consequently, the average net elasticities of energy demand with respect to technical progress, shown in panel G, closely parallel the estimates in panel F. 26 To conserve space I do not report the average long-run elasticities of technical change, ET η , which are very similar to the estimates in panel G. The latter are dominated by the elastic impacts with respect to induced innovation in four industries: electrical machinery, which is energy using, and construction, chemicals and services, which are all strongly energy saving.
Embodied technical change
The data on quasi-fixed inputs are noisy, consequently the impact of the evolution of ξ , are slightly energy saving for information technology and electrical equipment, mixed for machinery, and predominantly energy using for vehicles and structures.
The dearth of precise estimates makes it difficult to draw robust conclusions, but the pattern of significant effects suggests that embodied technical change may have a more pronounced impact on efficiency improvement than on the flexibility of production. There are also indications that while capacity expansion may limit the potential to conserve energy in response to energy price increases, it may enhance the substitutability of materials for energy.
Finally, the sign of the particular influence changes depending on the specific quasi-fixed input under consideration, with energy intensity being amplified by the efficiency impacts of vehicles and structures, but attenuated by the effects of IT capital on both efficiency and materials-energy substitution.
Explaining the Trend in Aggregate Energy Intensity
Results of the decomposition analysis
Chained indices for the effects The individual industry dynamics underlying these aggregate trends are noisy, but the contributions of a few sectors stand out. Metal mining, crude oil and gas, leather and government enterprises experience large increases in energy intensity relative to the 1958 base year, but these industries are in the minority. After the mid-1970s, the intensity of energy use falls in two-thirds of the industries in the sample. Most of these declines were modest, with cumulative intensity reductions of less than 50 percent relative to sectors' 1958 levels, but those in the chemicals, electrical and non-electrical machinery, and communications industries were very large. Thus, rather than being driven by large efficiency increases in a few key sectors, the decline in Ψ appears to be the result of slow and systematic improvements over a broad cross-section of industries in the economy. We now employ the econometric results of the previous section to elucidate the origins of this phenomenon.
The sources of efficiency change
By combining eqs. (11) and (20), we are able to estimate the impacts of the different sources of intra-industry efficiency change at the aggregate level. We construct chained indices of the left-hand side of eq. (11), whose evolution is shown in Figure 5 . Over the long run, the substitution effects associated with variable input prices tended to increase aggregate energy intensity, while technological progress, as well as the net effects of the accumulation and changes in the composition of quasi-fixed inputs, tended to have the opposite effect. The energyusing influence of substitution is slight prior to 1973 and pronounced during the period of low energy prices after 1993, increasing the intensity of industries' energy use by four percent over the 1959 level. In the interregnum, variable input price movements were associated with large energy-saving effects, particularly over the years 1974-1986, where they reduced intra-sectoral energy intensity by more than 12 percent relative to 1959.
The influence of technical change is very slightly energy using prior to 1980 and energy saving thereafter, ultimately giving rise to a nine-percent reduction in energy intensity below the 1959 level. Quasi-fixed inputs have an energy-using influence over two-thirds of the sample.
Prior to 1980 they are associated with increases in energy intensity of 17 percent above 1959 levels, but subsequently exhibit a dramatic decline which reduced energy intensity by 36 percent below its starting value.
The chained index of the sum of these various factors tracks the intra-industry efficiency index reasonably well, but it tends to overstate the reduction in energy intensity over much of the sample. This behavior can be traced to the residual errors in eq. (6), as well as a lack of precision in the estimated coefficients, whose values were set to zero if they did not achieve at least the ten percent level of significance.
Figures 6-8 shed light on the underpinnings of these trends. Figure 6 elucidates the different substitution responses associated with the relative prices of energy and materials. While the dynamics of the substitution effect in Figure 5 are largely driven by energy prices, the aggregate impact of material prices is uniformly energy-saving, which reduces intensity in the long run by more than seven percent below its 1958 level. This effect both moderates the substitution toward energy when the latter's price is low, and amplifies the energy-saving influence of substitution throughout the period of the OPEC price shocks. Figure 7 illustrates the effects of the components of technical change on the efficiency of industries' energy use. Exogenous technical progress is the primary driver of the long-run energy-saving impact of innovation seen in Figure 5 , which reduces intensity by more than five percent from its 1959 level. Induced innovation is energy-saving as well, but its ultimate effect is two-thirds as large. Interestingly, the early 1980s are a watershed period for technical change in two respects: The impact of induced innovation, which before that time was negligible, begins to have a significant impact, and the influence of autonomous technical progress switches direction from slightly energy using to strongly energy saving.
27 27 It bears emphasizing that the apparent breaks in the aggregate trends in the influence of technical progress on intensity occurs in the absence of breakpoints in the underlying estimated industry-level trends. The clear implication of eq. (6) is that the signs of α E,T and α E, Knowledge are constant for each industry over the entire sample period, and Table 4 indicates that the corresponding elasticities ε E,T and ¢ E,T are positive in some industries and negative in others. The shift in the sign of their influence at the macro level is a consequence of changes in the contributions of the various sectors to the efficiency component of aggregate energy intensity-in particular the larger weight enjoyed by those sectors which exhibit an energy-saving bias of technical change. This fact is most transparent in the case of autonomous technical change, where, by (11) , (13) and (20) It is worth noting the relatively small influence that ITC has on the energy-GDP ratio, an impact which will likely be further attenuated by a less optimistic treatment of the inducement effect of energy prices. Even so, the policy implications are not immediately clear-especially with respect to the problem of climate change. On one hand, the finding of a limited role for induced innovation would appear to support the conclusions drawn by Nordhaus (2002) from simulations. But mitigation measures are also expected to precipitate a steady increase in the prices of fossil fuels as constraints on GHG emissions bind more tightly on the economy, which under the current structural assumptions would provide a continual stimulus to the accumulation of energy-saving knowledge. As a result, it is also plausible that energy savings due to ITC will become increasingly important over the long time horizon over which emission limits are projected to bind. shifts in the composition of quasi-fixed inputs were as important as of changes in asset characteristics for the long-run evolution of energy intensity. Prior to 1980, virtually all types of larger declines in e, causing the contribution of their influence to increase, which eventually reverses the direction of technology's overall effect on aggregate intensity. The emergence of a similar pattern in the case of ITC suggests that both autonomous and induced innovations were acting in the same direction at the same time, but this result raises suspicion as to whether ITC's influence is properly identified. capital had energy-using effects, with IT capital and vehicles exerting negligible additional influences relative to 1959, and the remaining assets increasing energy intensity by one to six percent above the initial level. 28 In the wake of the first energy price shock the energy-using influence of electrical equipment declined from its high of four percent above the 1959 level, with its effect remaining at its initial level throughout the 1980s before falling sharply in the 1990s. After the second price shock the influence of vehicle capital stocks declined as well, plummeting from three percent above the initial level of intensity to 14 percent below. 29 The influence of structures mirrors that of equipment, peaking in the 1970s before returning to initial levels and undergoing a rapid decline in the early 1990s, falling seven percent in less than a decade. Machinery's influence is consistently energy-using throughout the sample, in the 1980s declining slightly from its peak of six percentage points and remaining essentially constant
thereafter.
An additional feature of these results in that the impact of IT capital became slightly energy-using in the late 1980s before exploding during the internet boom of the 1990s, raising aggregate energy intensity by six percent in as many years. This increase was large enough to completely offset the substantial energy savings associated with equipment, vehicles and structures. Thus, notwithstanding information technology's widespread association with embodied energy-saving technical progress, the uptick in energy use warranted by the rapid 28 Vehicles were associated with a slight reduction in aggregate intensity from 1959 levels over the period of the late 1960s and early 1970s. 29 This effect is most likely the result of the influence of corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) mandates on vehicle energy efficiency. The fuel economy of the vehicle fleet increased by one third between 1977 and 1988, but has remained essentially constant since then (NRC 2002) . The latter is period is precisely when the energy-saving impact of vehicles in Figure 8 stagnates.
accumulation of IT capital in the late 1990s appears to have substantially outweighed the latter's contribution to output over this period.
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I close with a summary of the main points. Table 5 
Conclusions
The story of the substantial decline in the energy intensity of the U.S. economy over the latter half of the past century is not a simple one. We have shown that it is mainly the result of changes in industrial composition and disembodied technological progress-especially of the autonomous variety. Substitution due to shifts in the relative price of energy has had a transitory effect, attenuating intensity in during energy price shocks but amplifying it when energy prices returned to their long-run levels. Innovation induced by energy price increases has had a consistently energy saving effect, which is the smallest of all of the factors considered.
Finally, although the analysis in the paper strives to be comprehensive, these results are by no means the last word on the origins of the historical decline in energy intensity. In particular, there is room for improvement on two fronts: development of improved estimates of the influence of ITC, and better characterization of the impact of embodied technical progress on energy demand. In the first instance, a key step is to identify the inducement effects of the prices of the various inputs on an output-based proxy for innovation (e.g., patents) while simultaneously estimating the propensity to innovate along with the influence of knowledge stocks on input demands. Progress on the second front hinges on the ability to estimate how the influences of contemporaneous innovations become capitalized into quasi-fixed inputs. This is likely to involve re-specification of the econometric model to include of interactions between the stocks of knowledge and tangible quasi-fixed inputs. Both of these issues are priorities for future research. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to third-order autocorrelation. Significance: 10% *, 5% **, 1% ***. Elastic positive and significant energy demand responses are underlined and in bold. Elastic negative and significant energy demand responses are underlined and in italics. † Significant estimates only. 
